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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
determining when reasonable expectations exist and in explaining the plain
view doctrine, the dimensions of permissible search and seizure in
Louisiana after Katz remain somewhat undefined. The "right to privacy"
enshrined in article I, section 5 of the 1974 Louisiana Constitution43 and
cited, but not discussed, by the court as a basis for its decision, ' is yet
another factor to be considered in structuring the protection to be given
Louisiana citizens against unreasonable searches and seizures.
Susan Ann Swanner
MATRIMONIAL REGIME REFORM-A CONSTITUTIONAL NECESSITY
Incarcerated as a result of state criminal charges brought against him
by his wife, and in need of security for his debt incurred in order to pay
attorney's fees, a husband executed a mortgage on the family home, a
community asset with title in the name of both spouses. Learning of the
mortgage only upon institution of foreclosure proceedings following de-
fault, the wife claimed that the Louisiana provision allowing a husband to
mortgage the family home without the wife's consent was unconstitutional
as a violation of the equal protection clause and a denial of due process.
The federal district court held that due to the contractual nature of
Louisiana's matrimonial regime system, there was no violation of the
United States Constitution. Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 430 F. Supp. 642
(E.D. La. 1977).
Within the last few years, statutory provisions outlining different
standards for males and females have been subjected to careful con-
sideration by the United States Supreme Court to determine whether they
deny the Constitution's guarantee of equal protection.' Although the Court
has not yet directed its attention to the management provisions of any
state's community property system, Louisiana's designation of the hus-
band as the head and master, or manager and controller, of the community
of gains, 2 could become a prime candidate for equal protection analysis.
43. See note I, supra.
44. 345 So. 2d at 469.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 3 provides: "No state shall ... deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws .... "
2. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2404: "The husband is the head and master of the
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Generally, the equal protection clause does not demand absolute
equality,3 but allows legislatures to employ reasonable classifications.
This requirement is intended to ensure that differential treatment bears a
"fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all
persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike." 4 In examining
statutes involving challenged classifications, the modern Supreme Court
has employed at least two different review standards . Active review or
strict scrutiny is invoked if the classification at issue involves "suspect"
criteria 6 or if the legislation impinges upon "fundamental" interests .7 To
withstand such strict scrutiny, the Court requires a showing that the
classification is a necessary means to achieve a legitimate state objective. 8
In contrast, under a restrained review, the statute will be upheld if it bears
any "rational relationship" to a legitimate state purpose. Until quite
recently, the level of scrutiny employed has been determinative of results;
if minimum rationality was chosen as the appropriate test, the statute
would withstand equal protection challenge. 9 Conversely, if strict scrutiny
was used, the statute would be rejected as unconstitutional almost without
exception. 10
There has been some question as to which test is the appropriate one
to use when examining a state statute based on gender classification.
Within the last decade, however, the Court has developed a test falling
somewhere between the two extremes: the Court carefully examines the
method used by a state to achieve the goal outlined by its statutory
provision, questioning whether the means used are a truly reasonable
method of achieving the purported goal of the statute. "
Reed v. Reed' 2 marked the departure point from the Court's passive
partnership or community of gains; he administers its effects, disposes of the
revenues which they produce, and may alienate them by an onerous title, without
the consent and permission of his wife."
3. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1,24, rehear-
ing denied, 411 U.S. 959 (1973).
4. F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920).
5. For a thorough discussion of the two standards of review, see Devel-
opments in the Law, Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1076-132 (1969).
6. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (miscegenation statutes).
7. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (right to travel).
8. See Developments in the Law, supra note 5, at 1101.
9. See Goesart v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948).
10. See Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971 Term, Foreword: In Search of
Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Modelfor a Newer Equal Protection, 86
HARV. L. REV. 1, 19 (1972).
11. See id. at 20-24.
12. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
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review stance in sex discrimination cases. Reed concerned an Idaho law
preferring males over females in the appointment of estate administrators.
Although the argument that the legislative preference furthered the pur-
pose of administrative convenience would have satisfied minimal rational-
ity standards, the Court determined that such dissimilar treatment for men
and women violated the equal protection clause.' 3
At one point after Reed several members of the Court attempted to
apply a strict scrutiny standard to sex classifications, 14 but this proposal
never gained majority acceptance.15 Recently in Craig v. Boren16 the
13. The Court in Reed stated, "A classification 'must be reasonable, not
arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substan-
tial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circum-
stanced shall be treated alike.' " Id. at 76, citing F.S. Royster Guano Co. v.
Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920). See text at note 3, supra. Although the words
were the same, the attitude of the Court was different. In Reed, the Court genuinely
considered whether a gender difference in competing estate administrator appli-
cants bore a rational relationship to the purported state objective of administrative
convenience.
14. In Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973), Justice Brennan (joined by
Justices Douglas, White and Marshall) concluded that statutory classifications
based on sex are inherently suspect. In separate opinions Justice Stewart and
Justice Powell (Powell joined by the Chief Justice and Justice Blackmun) found the
statutes to be unconstitutional based on the Reed analysis, feeling that it was
unnecessary to decide that sex was a suspect classification.
15. Some lower court decisions have relied on the strengthened rational-basis
approach used in Reed. See United States v. Reiser, 532 F.2d 673 (9th Cir. 1976)
(induction into the service of males but not females); Crawford v. Cushman, 531
F.2d 1114 (2d Cir. 1976) (Marine Corps requirement of discharge from the service if
a servicewoman becomes pregnant); Ritacco v. Norwin School Dist., 361 F. Supp.
930 (W.D. Pa. 1973) (requirement of separate girl's and boy's teams for interschol-
astic non-contact sports). Other lower courts have followed Frontiero's strict
scrutiny standard, thus considering sex as a suspect classification. See Duncan v.
General Motors Corp., 499 F.2d 835 (10th Cir. 1974) (loss of consortium; language
concerning strict scrutiny may be considered dictum here); Johnston v. Hodges, 372
F. Supp. 1015 (E.D. Ky. 1974) (requirement that minor's driver's license be signed
by father); Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1, 485 P.2d 529, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329
(1971) (employment of women bartenders; this case relied on strict scrutiny al-
though it was decided before Frontiero). However, subsequent Supreme Court
decisions have retreated from the strict scrutiny position either by distinguishing
Frontiero, as in Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974) (property tax exemption
allowed for widows but not for widowers), or by finding it unnecessary to decide
whether sex is a suspect classification, holding the statute unconstitutional by a less
strict standard as the Court did in Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975) (statute
designating a girl as a major at age 18, but a boy a major at age 21). The Court has
also decided some cases without invoking the term "suspect classification" at all.
See Weinberger v. Wiesenfield, 420 U.S. 636 (1975) (social security benefits pay-
able to widow but not to widower); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975)
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Court attempted to clarify the standards to be applied when considering
sex-based classifications when it struck down a statute which prohibited
the sale of 3.2% beer to males between eighteen and twenty, but allowed
such sales to females of the same age group. The Court purported to base
its holding on Reed, but articulated an intermediate test1 7 requiring "clas-
sifications by gender [to] serve important governmental objectives and
[to] be substantially related to the achievement of those objectives." 18 For
the present, the majority seems content to apply this intermediate test
when dealing with a sex classification.
Since the head and master provision is an explicit sex classification,
Craig seems to dictate that this statute be tested under the intermediate
standard. In the instant case the question of constitutionality was pre-
sented, but after a discussion of the standard that a gender-based classifi-
cation must meet, the federal district court declined to test Louisiana's
community of acquets under the new intermediate test.19
Kirchberg concerned the constitutionality of a Louisiana law in
effect in 1974 which allowed the husband to mortgage the family home
without the wife's consent unless the wife had filed a declaration stipulat-
(mandatory service discharges for lack of promotion more stringent for males than
for females).
In a 1976 case concerning a denial of Social Security benefits to illegitimates,
the Court in dictum discussed race and sex in a manner implying that both classifi-
cations demand extraordinary scrutiny, stating that "this discrimination against
illegitimates has never approached the severity or pervasiveness of the historical
legal and political discrimination against women and Negroes." Matthews v. Lucas,
427 U.S. 495, 506 (1976).
16. 429 U.S. 190, rehearing denied, 429 U.S. 1124 (1977).
17. Justice Rehnquist in his dissent pointed out that the majority did not base
the development of this new standard on any cited authority. 429 U.S. at 217. The
Court has subsequently cited Craig v. Boren as authority for the use of a stricter
standard. See Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430
U.S. 199 (1977).
18. 429 U.S. at 197 (emphasis added). Craig, however, is somewhat unusual in
that the discrimination was against males, rather than against females, and the
classification was not designed to remedy past discrimination against females by
giving some type of advantage over males. Such classifications are termed "be-
nign" and some have been upheld by the Court, but since the classification involved
in Craig, although involving a discrimination against males, was not "benign," the
test announced in Craig is not weakened by any possible remedial element involved
in the classification.
19. Although the Kirchberg case was decided before Craig, the court did
recognize that an intermediate approach would be the correct test when dealing
with a sex-based statute.
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ing the requirement of her authority and consent for the transaction.2 °
Expanding its discussion beyond the codal mortgage authorization and
addressing also the head and master provision of the Civil Code,2 the
district court determined that the contractual nature of these provisions
rendered application of the intermediate equal protection test inapprop-
riate.
The court found support for its decision in two propositions ar-
ticulated by Justice Black in his decision in Labine v. Vincent,22 a case
concerning inheritance rights of illegitimates. The first feature of Labine
relied upon was its notable reluctance to subject statutes concerning family
matters even to a test of mere rationality. Justice Black refused to question
the constitutionality of a Louisiana succession statute which prevented
acknowledged illegitimates from receiving the same inheritance rights as
legitimates. This failure to scrutinize the statute appeared to accord the
states great discretion in regulating family matters.
However, the propriety of this extremely deferential posture has been
severely eroded by Trimble v. Gordon,23 a Supreme Court decision
decided five days after Kirchberg. Although Trimble also concerned a
statute denying inheritance rights to illegitimates, the Court displayed little
reluctance to enter the area and to declare a denial of equal protection.
While distinguishing rather than overruling Labine, the Court insisted that
there is a point beyond which such deference cannot justify discrimina-
tion. 24
20. Prior to January 1, 1977, LA. CIv. CODE art. 2334 provided, in pertinent
part:
Where the title to immovable property stands in the names of both the
husband and wife, it may not be leased, mortgaged or sold by the husband
without the wife's written authority or consent where she has made a declara-
tion by authentic act that her authority and consent are required for such lease,
sale or mortgage and has filed such declaration in the mortgage and conveyance
records of the parish in which the property is situated.
1976 La. Acts, No. 679, § I amended this part of article 2334 to provide:
Where the title to immovable property stands in the names of both the
husband and wife, it may not be leased, mortgaged or sold by the husband
without the wife's written authority or consent.
Where the title to community immovable property declared to be the -family
home stands in the name of the husband alone it may not be leased, mortgaged
or sold without the wife's written authority or consent.
Thus the factual situation on which the case is based is now moot, but the
underlying question considered by the court, whether or not article 2404 is contrac-
tual, is still important.
21. See note 2, supra.
22. 401 U.S. 532 (1971).
23. 430 U.S. 762 (1977).
24. Id. at 767 n.12.
The court in the instant case also relied upon Labine for the conten-
tion that a statutory scheme which does not create an insurmountable
barrier for the alleged discriminatee, but instead allows an alternative
arrangement, should withstand a constitutional attack. The insurmountable
barrier touchstone, however, has not survived Trimble: in reference to the
deceased's ability to secure inheritance rights for his illegitimate children
through a will, the Trimble Court stated that "the focus on the presence or
absence of an insurmountable barrier is somewhat of an analytical anoma-
ly. "25 If a statutory differentiation cannot be justified as promoting a
legitimate state objective, the availability of an alternative and the absence
of an insurmountable barrier will not save it.26
Although the Trimble decision greatly undermined Labine, Trimble
can be distinguished from Kirchberg in that the Trimble barrier could only
be lifted by another individual by means of a testament, whereas the
Kirchberg barrier could be removed by the woman herself by filing a
declaration, or, with reference to the matrimonial regime provisions as a
whole, by contracting a different regime prior to marriage. Nevertheless,
what is involved here is the constitutional right to be free from discrimina-
tion. The woman could waive this right, but the Supreme Court has held
that waivers of fundamental rights generally cannot be presumed from
inaction, 27 a valid waiver being limited to "an intentional relinquishment
or abandonment of a known right or privilege.' 28
Assuming arguendo that the Kirchberg barrier is thus distinguishable
from Trimble, the contractual and thus voluntary nature of the matrimo-
nial regime as outlined in Kirchberg must be established to insulate the
scheme from an equal protection attack. However, the question of the
matrimonial regime system's contractual nature may not be as settled as
the Kirchberg court indicated. The community of gains, with the husband
legally designated as the head and master, forms the basis for the manage-
ment of assets and liabilities acquired during every marriage contracted in
Louisiana unless a contrary regime is expressly stipulated. 29 The Digest of
1808 required that the community of gains be a necessary consequence of
marriage,30 but with the addition of the phrase "if there be no stipulation
25. Id. at 773.
26. Id. at 774.
27. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 525 (1972).
28. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
29. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2399.
30. La. Digest of 1808, Book III, tit. 5, art. 63: "Every marriage contracted
within this territory, superinduces of right, partnership or community of acquets or
gains. This community or partnership of gains takes place whether there be a
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to the contrary"'" in 1825, Louisiana marriage partners were able to alter
the community of gains in any manner not contrary to law or good
morals.32 This apparent capacity to alter the community regime does not
mean that the property management system with the husband as head and
master is a product of a voluntary selection of both spouses. 33 The
contractual character of the matrimonial regime articles as a whole is less
than clear because the marriage contract envisioned by the Civil Code
differs in three important respects from other contracts.
34
In the first place, the most important difference between the marriage
contract and other contracts is the perpetual nature of the marriage
contract. It cannot be dissolved by mutual consent, but instead exists until
there is a dissolution of the marriage 35 or a judgment of separation from
bed and board, 36 or until the wife proves the husband's "mismanage-
ment" or "disorder" in a suit for separation of property. 37 In addition,
with minor exceptions, marriage partners can change their matrimonial
agreement before marriage, but not afterwards. 38
marriage contract between the parties or not, and although in case there be one, said
contract be entirely silent on this partnership or community." Id. art. 10: "The
partnership or community of acquets or gains, is a necessary consequence of
marriage, within this territory and needs not be stipulated in the marriage contract in
order to take effect."
31. La. Civ. Code of 1825, art. 2369.
32. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 11, 2325. Additionally, marriage partners are not
allowed to "alter the order of descents." Id. art. 2326.
33. But see LA. R.S. 9:264 (Supp. 1975). This act refers to "the conclusive
presumption of law that spouses who have not entered into a marriage contract
before marriage did contract tacitly the community of gains." This statement has
been interpreted by one commentator as evidence of the contractual character of
Louisiana's matrimonial regime laws. See The Work of the Louisiana Appellate
Courts for the 1975-1976 Term-Matrimonial Regimes, 37 LA. L. REV. 358 (1977).
34. As early as 1851 the Louisiana Supreme Court stated, "Marriage is a civil
contract, to be sure; but it is a contract which the interest of society requires should
be regulated in its consequences, and especially in its effects upon property, by the
general and existing laws of the State." Deshautels v. Fontenot, 6 La. Ann. 689
(1851).
35. Obviously the death of either marriage partner dissolves the community of
gains. In addition, a judgment of divorce dissolves the community retroactively to
the date on which the original petition was filed. LA. CIv. CODE art. 159.
36. Id. art. 155.
37. Id. art. 2425 provides: "The wife may, during the marriage, petition against
the husband for a separation of property, whenever her dowry is in danger, owing
to the mismanagement of her husband, or otherwise, or when the disorder of his
affairs induces her to believe that his estate may not be sufficient to meet her rights
and claims."
38. Id. art. 2329.
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Second, the choices available to the spouses are circumscribed by the
Code. A husband and wife may modify the community of gains or even
eliminate it, but the husband must be the head of any community of gains
which the parties contract. A couple's desire to make the wife the head and
master would be prevented by the Civil Code which states that the husband
and wife cannot "derogate by their matrimonial agreement from the rights
resulting from the power of the husband over the person of his wife and
children, or which belong to the husband as the head of the family. ",39 To
eliminate the head and master provision, a separation of property would
have to be contracted, thus indicating that this feature is not essentially
contractual in the same sense as provisions of ordinary contracts. Spouses
may either stipulate by contract that there will be no community between
them,' or they may modify the community by providing for unequal
portions or by apportioning fruits of specific property, 41 so long as they do
not reduce the husband's power as head and master over the community.
Finally, the choice involved in selecting a regime may not be truly
knowing or voluntary. Traditionally most Louisiana couples have not
drafted marriage contracts replacing the Code's regime,4 2 but today mar-
riage contracts are becoming more popular. However, usually those who
do make such contracts are entering their second marriage.4 3
One explanation for the small number of alternative marriage
contracts in first marriages is the failure of young people to appreciate
their opportunity to derogate from the regime. One attempt to remedy this
problem was a recent enactment" which requires all marriage license
issuing officers to give each prospective spouse a written summary of
current matrimonial regime laws. Although an effort toward reform, this
disclosure provision hardly ensures that the woman's choice is truly
knowing and voluntary. When the summary is delivered, the prospective
spouse, who most often has a limited understanding of Louisiana law, may
have little time to absorb and understand her options and the consequences
of her choice. To make the choice an intelligent, "knowing" choice may
require the services of an attorney to advise the spouses on selecting the
regime most appropriate for their needs. Also, a notary's services are
required to authenticate the act. 45 Consequently, choosing a regime differ-
39. Id. art. 2327.
40. Id. art. 2392.
41. Id. art. 2424.
42. H. DAGGETT, COMMUNITY PROPERTY SYSTEM OF LOUISIANA 115 (1945).
43. R. PASCAL, LOUISIANA FAMILY LAW COURSE 75 (1973).
44. LA. R.S. 9:264 (Supp. 1975).
45. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2328.
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ent from that provided by the Code involves certain expenses which not all
couples can easily afford.46 In addition, the legislative scheme does not
promote an atmosphere conducive to completely voluntary choice. For the
prospective bride to request a regime differing from that provided by the
Code might imply a lack of trust and confidence in her intended spouse. A
certain inhibition is necessarily present.
The unusual characteristics of the matrimonial regime system, and
particularly the head and master provision, suggest that a waiver-type
argument will not obviate the need to test the gender-based classification
under the intermediate scrutiny test articulated in Craig. To determine
whether the gender-based classification advances any important objec-
tives, the legislative purpose in designating the husband as the head and
master of the community must first be considered. The usual justification
rests on "economic, cultural and biological grounds." 47 The state could
contend that the husband's designation as head and master promotes the
important objective of an efficient management of community resources,
claiming that the husband is more likely to be employed and familiar with
business transactions than his wife and thus is generally the more capable
spouse.48 However, this overly broad assumption is not sustainable after
the recent decision of Califano v. Goldfarb.49 In that case the Court
indicated that gender-based differentiations "supported by no more sub-
stantial justification than 'archaic and overbroad' generalizations, . . . or
'old notions,' . . . such as 'assumptions as to dependency' . . . that are
more consistent with 'the role-typing society has long imposed' than with
contemporary reality" are forbidden by the Constitution. 50 The govern-
ment offered impressive statistical evidence concerning the greater inci-
46. The state might be required to provide free drafting services to help pros-
pective spouses draw up alternative contracts. See Bilbe, Constitutionality of Sex-
Based Differentiations in the Louisiana Community Property Regime, 19 Loy. L.
REV. 373 (1973).
47. Bartke, Community Property Law Reform in the United States and in
Canada-A Comparison and Critique, 50 TUL. L. REV. 214, 224 (1976).
48. Even if this assertion could be upheld, there is information indicating that
the stereotypic categorization of the male as the only wage-earning spouse is
archaic. In 1974 out of a total of 55,053,000 families in the United States, there were
21,922,000 in which both spouses worked. Out of the white families in this group,
the wife's earnings made up 24.9% of the average family income, and in the black
families the wife's earnings comprised 32.4% of the average family income. U.S.
DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES 411 (97th annual ed. 1976); DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, THE U.S. FACT BOOK 39 (97th annual ed. 1976).
49. 430 U.S. 199 (1977).
50. Id. at 207.
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dence of dependent wives in defense of survivor's benefits automatically
payable to a widow but allowed to a widower only if he was dependent on
his wife for half of his support. 5 1 In spite of the general correlation
between sex and dependency, the Supreme Court found the presumption
involved to be based on archaic and intolerably overbroad generalizations.
Similarly, broad assumptions by the Louisiana legislature equating sex
with capacity to administer would not withstand careful scrutiny. Even
assuming that placing only one spouse in control might be a legitimate
objective when considering the necessity for orderly, secure property
transactions, the basis for the choice should be capability, not sex.
Another plausible rationale supporting the legislative designation is
that the tacit selection of the husband as head of the community mirrors the
actual intent of the parties. This presumed intent argument was presented
in Trimble when the state sought to justify intestate succession provisions
as being "statutory wills" based on the "presumed intent" of the citizens
of the state.52 Although disposing of the argument by finding that the
statute involved was not enacted for this purpose, the Court in dictum
questioned whether mirroring the supposed intent of the people could be a
constitutionally permissible state objective.5 3 Intestate succession laws and
matrimonial regime laws such as Louisiana has are acts of states, not acts
of individuals themselves. The Court was well aware of the alternative
prescribed by state law when it stated, "With respect to any individual,
the argument of knowledge and approval of the state law is sheer fic-
tion." 54 Even though an individual could disinherit his illegitimate chil-
dren or draft his own matrimonial regime, the Court questioned where the
burden of inertia in such cases should fall. The Court indicated that the
state will not be permitted to utilize the concept of "implied consent" to
place the burden of inaction upon a disadvantaged class which has been a
frequent target of discrimination.
In light of the dubious constitutionality of Louisiana's matrimonial
regime provisions there is a need for revision by the state legislature. The
seven other states which employ a community of gains concept have
already changed their provisions concerning the manager of the communi-
ty.55 Six states have incorporated some form of "equal management"
51. Id. at 238 n.7.
52. 430 U.S. at 774.
53. Id. at 775 n.16.
54. Id.
55. These seven states are Texas, Arizona, California, Idaho, Nevada, New
Mexico and Washington. See Bartke, supra note 47, esp. 216 n.16.
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whereby either spouse alone may manage the community movable proper-
ty, but both parties must participate in matters involving immovable
property. 56 Texas's newly adopted system differs by allowing each spouse
to manage individually those things which he would have owned if single.
If community property subject to the management of one spouse is
combined with community property under the sole control of the other
spouse, this "mixed community property" must then be jointly con-
trolled 5
Recent attempts have been made to change Louisiana's matrimonial
regime laws with special attention given to the management provisions.
During the 1977 regular session of the legislature, several proposals for
reform were submitted, 58 two of which provided for an equal management
system similar to those adopted by most of the other community property
states.59 Although none of the matrimonial regime revision bills passed,
the legislature did adopt a resolution60 creating a joint subcommittee to
study a revision of matrimonial regime law. Any bill drafted and proposed
by this subcommittee must include a provision giving "each spouse...
the right to manage, control and dispose of community property except
where specifically provided otherwise .... ,,61 The joint subcommittee
is required by the resolution to submit its proposals in writing to the
legislature at least two months before the 1978 regular session.
56. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-214 (1976); CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 5125, 5127
(Deering 1977); IDAHO CODE § 32-912 (Supp. 1976); NEV. REV. STAT. § 123.230
(1975); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-4A-7, 8 (Supp. 1975); WASH. REV. CODE. ANN. §
26.16.030 (Supp. 1976).
57. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 22 (1975).
58. A proposal introduced by the Louisiana State Law Institute stipulated that
each spouse would have control over those things produced by his own effort, while
things produced by a joint effort could be managed by either spouse. However,
community immovables, registered corporeal movables, and registered incorporeal
movables would be controlled by the spouse with title to the property. The manage-
ment of unregistered movables would be determined by possession. La. H.B. 783,
40th Reg. Sess. (1977).
59. La. H.B. 247, 1278, 40th Reg. Sess. (1977).
60. La. S. Con. Res. 54, 40th Reg. Sess. (1977).
61. Id. The joint subcommittee will be composed of five senators and five
representatives selected by the respective chairmen of the Senate Committee on
Judiciary, section "A" and the House Committee on Civil Law and Procedure. An
advisory committee consisting of six members was also created and will include one
man and one woman to be appointed by the president of the Louisiana State Bar
Association. Additionally, the dean of each law school in the state will submit the
names of one man and one woman. From this list the Speaker of the House of
Representatives and the President of the Senate will each select one man and one
woman to be on the advisory committee.
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Inevitably, some changes will be made in Louisiana's matrimonial
regime laws. It is hoped that action will be taken by the legislature to
prevent the present scheme for designating management control from
reaching the Supreme Court where it most assuredly will fail the test
outlined in Craig. A gender-based discrimination such as this, supported
by objectives that cannot withstand a constitutional attack, should not be a
part of the Louisiana Civil Code, and it is time for Louisiana to follow the
example set by her sister community property states and to modernize her
matrimonial regime provisions.
Nancy Clark Tyler
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